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A Rational Foreign Policy Toward Haiti and
How the Media Shapes Public
Perception of Haiti
IRA KURZBAN
I. $2 BILLION, THE MEDIA, AND HARD FACTS
The public perception created by the media in the United States
regarding Haiti is that since 1991 the United States has spent over $2
billion seeking to make Haiti a democratic country with a viable econ-
omy and that all of those efforts have been unsuccessful.' Even sympa-
thetic members of Congress and the public question what went wrong in
Haiti and how we could have spent so much money and introduced a
United States military presence into that country with so little progress.2
One could hardly get any other impression after reading and seeing the
barrage of negative articles and stories in the media, in Congress, and in
journals that are aimed at Haiti.
Without deviation, this media barrage repeats the same themes:
Haiti is a country of economic calamity, ecological disaster, political
paralysis, and national doom, combined with the specter of a refugee
flotilla headed for Florida.' The presidential election in the United
States has only emboldened the economic elites and their allies among
the former military and anti-democratic forces in Haiti to disregard Aris-
tide's election and to attempt to undermine democracy further. The
economy in Haiti is clearly stalled and some in the tiny political opposi-
tion opposing Aristide and Preval are bent upon destroying the remain-
der of the political fabric.4 If the United States' policy has been a
failure, then we need to examine what went wrong and what policies we
should pursue in the alternative. We also need to examine the media's
role in that failure.
In my view, there is little doubt that our policies in Haiti have
1. See United States General Accounting Office, GAO-01-24, Foreign Assistance: Any
Further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should Be Linked to Performance-Related Conditions 1
(2001); United States General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-96-38, United States Costs in
Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda. App. 1 (1996).
2. See Keep Pressure on Haiti, USA TODAY, Nov. 29, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL
5796788; Hapless in Haiti, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 23300704.
3. See id.; see also JACK LULE, DAILY NEWS, ETERNAL STORIES: THE MYTHOLOGICAL ROLE
OF JOURNALISM 244 (2001).
4. See Joseph E. Baptiste & Bob Maguire, Intransigence is a Nonstarter, FT. LAUD. SUN
SENT., June 11, 2001, at 25A, available at LEXIS, Newspaper Stories, Combined Papers.
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failed. I differ, however, with the general wisdom seen in media analysis
of American policy in Haiti regarding the source of that failure and the
standards to determine policy failure. Haiti has not failed the United
States. Rather, the United States has failed Haiti. In order to determine
the nature and the measurement of that failure, some of the media's
assertions that are claimed as "facts" regarding our actions in Haiti need
to be examined. For example, it is not true that we have spent $2 billion
dollars on or in Haiti despite what the media has claimed. Over
$250,000,000 of that money went toward the interdiction of Haitians
seeking to leave Haiti during the most repressive stage of the military
coup in that country. These funds cannot fairly be included in any
calculus regarding our assistance to Haiti. Nor can we count as "aid" to
Haiti the hundreds of millions of dollars that were spent by the United
States military in corporate giveaways to American companies, such as
Brown and Root, for everything from laundry for our troops to commu-
nications systems which were ripped out and probably discarded when
the United States troops left Haiti.5 Included in the $2 billion figure is
the vast psychological operations program (pys-ops) that was performed
on the Haitian people by our men in green during Aristide's return.6
This is not to say that the presence of American troops during the first
days before and immediately after Aristide's return did not perform an
important function by stopping the massacres and permitting Aristide's
government to destroy the hated Haitian army once and for all. Never-
theless, the excessive costs and the lavish nature of spending by Ameri-
can companies and the United States military in Haiti should hardly be
attributed by the media as some form of "aid" to Haitians.
Nor should we ignore the fact that the remainder of the hundreds of
millions of dollars in American aid that went to Haiti as part of that $2
billion figure mostly went to beltway companies to do studies that gen-
erally have little impact or no effect, long or short-term, on the Haitian
people.7 It is typical of United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) officials to go back to Capitol Hill and boast about how our
foreign aid dollars "are returned to the United States" because they go
mostly to United States companies conducting studies or overseeing pro-
grams.8 These boasts are then reported on by the media, helping to fuel
5. See generally Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr., Logcap: Providing Vital Services
to Soldiers, ENGINEER, Mar. 1997, available at http://www.wood.army.mil.ENGRMAG/PB5971/
logcap.htm.
6. See generally Douglas Waller Washington, Onward Cyber Soldier, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/archive/1995/950821/950821.cover.html.
7. See Catherine Orenstein, The Roads Built in Haiti Only Go So Far, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2001, at B5.
8. Neil Elliot, Capitalism Seems to Rule U.S. Policy Toward Haiti, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis, MN), June 13, 1992, at 17A.
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and spread the misconceptions.
It is not simply that most aid is returned to the United States that
results in little impact on Haiti, it is that the aid programs themselves are
generally designed to have little impact on the vast majority of Haitians,
who are without basic care, live in rural areas, and are engaged in agra-
rian pursuits.9 Rather than directing our aid to the 70% of the popula-
tion that lives in poor agrarian areas, the majority of AID funds are spent
to bolster the "private sector," assist in the "privatization process," fur-
ther the goals of the International Monetary Fund program, or develop
and bolster the opposition to the government.' 0 For example, in 2000,
the United States government allocated $3 million to the International
Republican Institute and other organizations not simply to help opposi-
tion parties in Haiti, but to "develop" opposition parties.II In light of the
outrage in the United States following the revelations that the Chinese
government may have attempted to provide contributions to United
States candidates, it is nothing short of bizarre that our government
would spend money in a foreign country to create an opposition to the
government we are supposed to be supporting. This, of course, does not
include covert funds spent in Haiti to accomplish the same ends. Again,
the media is not accurately reporting these facts. By misrepresenting
this information, the American public's notion that United States aid in
Haiti has been a failure is reinforced.
II. COMMON MEDIA MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDING HAITI
If we are to pursue a rational policy of assistance in Haiti, we must
see Haiti as it is and not what we hope it to be. 2 This requires more
accurate and careful reporting by the press. I would like to highlight
some important facts about Haiti that tend to be omitted in news reports.
First, Haiti is an agrarian country. 13 Most of its population lives in rural
areas and most people make whatever meager living they can off of the
land. 14
Second, a small elite has prevented the development of a free mar-
ket economy in Haiti. 5 This small elite ruthlessly competes for the
9. Letter from Melinda Miles, Coordinator, Haiti Reborn/Quixote Center, at http://www.
waronwant.org/cointreau/privitization.htm (last checked Jan. 1, 2002).
10. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 216 (2000); Douglas Farah,
Aristide Turns to Privatization, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at At.
11. GOP Agency is Accused of Aiding Haiti's Right Wing; Building a Party System Threatens
'Political Order,' Aristide Loyalists Charge, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 14, 1998, at A15.
12. CHETAN KUMAR, BUILDING PEACE IN HAm 33 (1998).
13. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 216 (2000); IRWIN P. STOTZKY,
SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997).
14. Id.
15. See Farah, supra note 10, at A12; see also STOTZKY, supra note 13.
2002]
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scarce markets in the country and has no desire to develop Haiti into a
true market economy. 16 They both fear and hold in contempt the masses
in Haiti.17 Although they are well thought of in the United States
because they speak English well, have attended American schools, are
bright, persuasive, and charming, the masses see them as part of the
system that maintains the poverty and misery that surrounds most
Haitians.
Third, the assembly or manufacturing sector in Haiti has never been
more than of marginal assistance in alleviating the country's massive
unemployment. 8 Fourth, the Lavalas movement and Jean Bertrand
Aristide are widely popular in Haiti because they represent the hopes
and aspirations of the vast majority of Haitians. 9 The Haitian popula-
tion, although largely uneducated, is highly intelligent, highly moti-
vated, and very aware of its own self-interest. 20 This is not a country
where false consciousness prevails.2 1
Fifth, democracy in Haiti, as in every other place in the world,
including the United States, takes many years to fully develop.22 The
belief that somehow Haitian history and culture has prevented democ-
racy from taking root, as claimed by some in the media, is silly and
ignores reality. 23 Haiti has been a democracy for less than seven years
since the end of the military coup. During the first twenty years of
democracy in the United States, we had an armed rebellion (Shays
Rebellion), we completely redesigned our form of government (from the
Articles of Confederation to the Constitution), and we took one presi-
dential election away from the people and gave it to Congress to decide
(Jefferson's election). It took us almost another 170 years before non-
landowners, women, and people of color could truly vote in an elec-
tion. 24 Haiti's democracy is vibrant, flourishing, and will only become
stronger in the future if we refrain from interfering with it or micro-
managing it.
Sixth, Haiti, like all developing democracies that ended brutal,
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See letter from Melinda Miles, supra note 9.
19. See Tale of Two Haitis: One Real, One Virtual, HAITI PROGRtS, Feb. 7-13, 2001,
available at http://www.haiti-progres.com/2001/smOI0207/XENG0207.htm; STOTZKY, supra note
13.
20. See KUMAR, supra note 12, at 34-35.
21. See id.
22. See Hugh Byrne & Rachel Neild, Success in Haiti is Possible, but not 'Overnight,'
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 28, 1997, at 18.
23. See KUMAR, supra note 12, at 51-59 (describing in detail Haiti's struggle for a democratic
government).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1; U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX, §1.
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authoritarian regimes, has had a substantial increase in crime and, there-
fore, insecurity. When insecurity is coupled with impunity, crime rises
dramatically. Haiti is not unique in this respect.25 Seventh, the scourge
of drug trafficking plagues Haiti with insecurity, corruption, and threat
to true national security.26
III. A RATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS HAITI
How does a rational foreign policy address this Haiti instead of the
one invented by our country? Clearly, our short term interests in Haiti
are to prevent drugs and refugees from entering the United States. Our
long term interests, however, are to create conditions where Haitians
may not only survive, but flourish in Haiti. It is in our long term interest
to have a stable economy in Haiti that assists the massive poor and that
brings them, as President Aristide often says, from misery to poverty
with dignity. The following suggestions are an outline of how we may
move in that direction.
A. STOP INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF HAITI
We should not waste our limited resources in creating parties to
oppose the government that we are working with. Current policy of the
United States is nothing more than an effort to paralyze the Haitian
economy and to drive Aristide from office. The full scale international
embargo, through the IDB, World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund, that has been driven by the United States is moraly repugnant,
willingly sacrifices the people of Haiti to economic destruction and
utterly fails to move true democracy forward. There is no serious oppo-
sition to the Lavalas movement in Haiti at the present time; Jean Ber-
trand Aristide will remain a revered figure for many years to come.
Perhaps that will change over time and people will see other alternatives.
Our policy, however, is simply counterproductive and creates greater
paralysis within Haiti. Our efforts to curb Aristide's authority or popu-
larity, to support the opposition and thereby force some type of coalition
government, and to put pressure on him to make various concessions is
unproductive. These efforts will not create greater stability in Haiti and
are likely to embitter the masses of people against the United States,
since they view these efforts as an attempt to re-establish the elite's con-
trol over Haitian political and economic life and to nullify the previous
elections that have widespread support in Haiti.
25. See, e.g., Crime and Disorder Increase in Shadow of Free Elections, CIME & JUST.
INr'L., Vol. 9, No.l, Feb.-Mar. 1999.
26. See Michelle Faul, Caribbean Island is Becoming a Hot Spot for Smuggling Narcotics,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 17, 2000, at A4.
2002]
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B. Ask the Haitian Government What They Need To
Help The Economy
We consistently make the same error in believing that we know
what is best for Haiti. The Haitian government should be treated with
the dignity and respect that any democratically elected government
deserves. Whether we agree with the policies of Lavalas or not, we need
to find constructive ways to help the government on its own terms, not
ours. This means that we must become good listeners. We need to assist
the government in what it believes will spark development and provide
assistance to its people. We need to stop listening to the small elite who
have de facto controlled United States policy toward Haiti. We need to
begin to listen to a government that represents the broad interests of all
Haitian people.
C. Provide Haiti With the Technical Expertise and Financial
Resources to Transform Agrarian Life
The United States possesses the world's greatest expertise on elimi-
nating agrarian and rural poverty.27 We have the most successful rural
electrification program in the history of the world.28 We have the most
advanced farming facilities and agricultural techniques.29 These would
help Haiti move toward self-sufficiency in food production. We have the
ability to provide millions of dollars in micro-credit programs for farm-
ers in rural Haiti.3" The rural areas of the United States have the world's
most extensive public school networks.31 We have developed wind,
solar, and other reusable forms of power that we could bring to Haiti.32
Aid in this form should go through farming collectives, other rural col-
lectives, and to the government of Haiti. We should assist the farmers, as
do groups, such as Oxfam. We should assist in breaking the hold that
the small elite has over the export of crops. Instead of assisting the
27. See generally Strategic Plan for FY 2000-2005, United States Department of Agriculture
(Sept. 2000), available at http://www.usda.gov/ocfo/sp2005/sp2005.pdf.
28. See Joel A. Youngblood, Alive and Well; The Rural Electrification Act Preempts State
Condemnation Law: City of Morgan City v. South Louisiana Electric Cooperative Association, 16
ENERGY L.J. 489 (1995); see also United States Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities
Service, Rural Electric Program, at http://www.usda.gov/rus/electric/index.htm (last checked Jan.
1, 2002).
29. See generally Strategic Plan for FY 2000-2995, United States Department of Agriculture
(Sept. 2000), available at http://www.usda.gov/ocfo/sp2005/sp2OO5.pdf.
30. See generally Paul Lewis, Micro-loans for the Very Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at
sec. 4, p.1 .
31. See generally National Center for Educational Statistics, Navigating Resources for Rural
Schools, at http://www.nces.ed.gov/surveys/ruraledlabout.asp (last checked Jan. 1, 2002).
32. United States Energy Production, Country Energy Data (1999), available at http://www.
eia.doe.gov/emeu/world/country/cntry-US.html.
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existing private sector, we should help to create other free markets for
the distribution of agricultural products.33 Additionally, the United
States has great expertise in rural health programs.34 The government of
Cuba, with few resources, has been able to transform rural health in
Haiti by placing many doctors at an extremely low cost in the most rural
areas of the country.35 The United States has the capability through our
rural health programs and our technical expertise to develop health care
programs where none previously existed.36 We need to provide, how-
ever, as has Cuba, the medical programs themselves, rather than the
design for a program that may never be used.
D. Assist Haiti to Fight Crime and Drug Trafficking
Our country has enormous resources that we can provide to assist
the Haitian National Police.37 We can provide the Haitian National
Police with the technological capability to fight drug trafficking as well
as other crimes.38 We have the physical equipment (e.g. "go fast" boats,
sophisticated listening devices, AWACs) to dramatically transform
Haiti's ability to stop drugs from entering Haiti.39 We have the ability to
provide advanced forensic techniques and intelligence gathering. n
These would be of substantial assistance to the Haitian government in its
effort to fight crime and drug trafficking. We can provide consistent,
sustained training to the Haitian police. With the help of the United
States, the Haitian police departments could develop an internal com-
mand structure, an oversight and anti-corruption process, and a facility
33. See generally Douglas E. Matthews, Economic Sanctions and Economic Strategies:
Towards Haiti's Integration Into the World Economy, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 281, 298-99 (1994).
34. Press Release, HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson Announces New Initiatives for Rural
Communities (July 25, 2001), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010725b.
html.
35. South African Health Authorities Call Cuban Solidarity An Inspiring Gesture For The
South African People (Radio Havana Cuba broadcast, Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.
radiohc.org/Distributions/RadioHavana -English/I998/98_dec/rhc-eng- 12.16.98.
36. Press Release, HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson Announces New Initiatives for Rural
Communities (July 25, 2001), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010725b.
html.
37. See generally Military Strategy Requirements: Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services
Comm., (Mar. 7, 2000) (statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps
Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command), available at 2000 WL 11068965.
38. See generally Drug Interdiction Efforts: Hearing Before the Comm. On Government
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, (May 1, 2001) (statement
of Donnie R. Marshall, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration), available at 2001 WL
2007762. See also Military Strategy Requirements: Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services
Comm. (Mar. 7, 2000) (statement of General Charles E. Wilhelm, United States Marine Corps
Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command), available at 2000 WL 11068965.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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to train more entry level police. We also have the ability to provide
technical assistance concerning community policing, citizen participa-
tion, and other methods of community participation in fighting crime.4
IV. CONCLUSION
These suggestions represent just the beginning of a rational
approach to assist Haiti. They are premised, of course, on our sincere
desire to assist Haiti.42 Our goal must be economic development for all
Haitian citizens, not the promotion of a narrow agenda that assists the
economic elites. The media should focus on what is really occuring in
Haiti and not focus on generalized themes or misconceptions. Only if
the American public is truly informed can we have a rational foreign
policy towards Haiti.
41. Id.
42. See STOTZKY, supra note 13, for an extensive discussion on the development of
democracy in Haiti.
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